Disclosure of Prior Statements of a Government Witness in Federal Criminal Prosecutions by Editors,
[Vol. 106
COMMENT
DISCLOSURE OF PRIOR STATEMENTS OF A
GOVERNMENT WITNESS IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
Defendants in federal criminal prosecutions who seek prior statements
of government witnesses from government files for the purpose of impeach-
ment 1 have encountered the assertion of a congressionally authorized privi-
lege. 2 While recognizing the importance of non-disclosure to law. enforce-
ment agencies, particularly in the area of subversive activities, courts have
been prompted by considerations of fairness to order limited disclosure.
Failure to comply with such an order has been said to require dismissal of
the prosecution.5 Until recently the law has been unsettled as to (1) the
basis for ordering disclosure, (2) the procedural requirements necessary
to acquire an order for disclosure and (3) the extent of the disclosure
required.
In those cases in which production of witness' statements have been
required,4 the bases for ordering disclosure have varied. Some courts
have claimed that institution of a criminal action constitutes waiver or
abandonment of the privilege,5 while others have asserted that it is un-
1. The courts have agreed that the witness' statements can be used only to im-
peach. Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 885
(1953) ; United States v. Brown, 17 F.R.D. 286, 288 (N.D. Ill. 1955) ; United States v.
Bell, 126 F. Supp. 612, 617-18 (D.D.C. 1955). Under UNIFoRm RULES OF EVIDENCE
rule 63(1) the statements would be admissible substantively as well as for impeach-
ment.
2. Rsv. STAT. § 161 (1875), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1952). This statute provides that "the
head of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with
law, for . . . the custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, and property
appertaining to [the department)." Pursuant to this statute, the Attorney General has
promulgated regulations forbidding his subordinates to turn over any document in de-
partment files without his approval: Order no. 3229, 28 C.F.R. § 51.71 (Supp. 1946),
as amended and supplemented, PiKE & FIscHER AD. L. (2d ser.) Department of Jus-
tice 1-2. The Supreme Court held that a subordinate cannot be held in contempt for
following these regulations, United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951),
but refused to consider "the ultimate reach of the authority of the Attorney General to
refuse to produce ... the government papers ... [since he] was not before the trial
court." Id. at 467. See Timbers & Cohen, Demands of Litigants for Government In-
formation, 18 U. PITT. L. Rxv. 687 (1957).
3. United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1948); United States v.
Andolschek, 142 F2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 1944) (by implication).
4. Disclosure is not unique to criminal actions. It has also been ordered where the
Government is plaintiff in a civil suit. United States v. Cotton Valley Operators Comm.,
9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D. La. 1949), aff'd by an equally divided court, 339 U.S. 940 (1950).
Where the Government is a party defendant disclosure will apparently not be ordered,
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) (dictum), nor in a federal proceeding in
which the Government is not a litigant, United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S.
462 (1951), nor in a state proceeding, Parsons v. State, 251 Ala. 467, 38 So. 2d 209
(1948).
5. E.g., United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946); United States v.
Krulewitch, 145 F2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944).
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conscionable to undertake prosecution and then invoke the privilege to
deprive defendant of possible exculpatory information.6 Further uncer-
tainty has existed with respect to the procedural requirements necessary
to acquire an order for production of the documents. When defendant
has sought direct access to the witness' statements, many courts have
required a showing of contradiction between the witness' testimony and the
statements.7 Other cases have rested disclosure in the discretion of the
trial judge.8 The Second Circuit has adhered to the practice of requiring
the Government to submit requested statements to the trial court for ex-
amination in camera,9 the court being obligated to turn over to the defend-
ant any statements admissible for the purpose of impeachment. 10 The final
problem, the portion of the official documents required to be disclosed to
6. E.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953) (dictum) ; United States
er rel. Schlueter v. Watkins, 67 F. Supp. 556, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (dictum); Berger
& Krash, Government Immunity From Discovery, 59 YAM L.J. 1451, 1453-54 (1950).
A few courts have suggested that the sixth amendment requires disclosure. United
States v. Schneiderman, 106 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Christoffel v. United
States, 200 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir.) (dictum), rev'd on. otler grounds, 345 U.S. 947 (1952).
The portion of the sixth amendment invoked in such cases is that which affords to the
accused the right "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his fa-
vor... !' U.S. CoNsTr. amend. VI.
7. In Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953), the Court required disclosure
where the defendant had shown, inter alia, contradiction. This was interpreted to mean
that the defendant was required to show contradiction before he could inspect that
statement, e.g., Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1955); Scanlon v.
United States, 223 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1955). Cf. United States v. Bookie, 229 F.2d 130
F 7th Cir. 1956) (defendant sought to see prior statements of his own witness). But see
isher v. United States, 231 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1956). In Jencks v. United States, 353
U.S. 657 (1957), the Court said that Gordon, supra, had not meant to imply that a
showing of contradiction was a prerequisite. Id. at 667.
8. E.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942) (this case apparently has
been overruled by the Jencks case) ; d'Aquino v. United States, 192 F2d 338 (9th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935 (1952); Kaufman v. United States, 163 F.2d 404
(6th Cir. 1947).
9. E.g., United States v. Cohen, 145 F2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
799 (1945) ; United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944); Note, 41 CoR-
i Lzi L.Q. 737 (1956).
10. In those courts adhering to the Second Circuit practice, failure by the trial
judge to disclose contradictory statements to the defendant has required reversal of
the conviction. Scales v. United States, 227 F.2d 581 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. granted,
350 U.S. 992 (1956) ; United States v. Lebron, 222 F2d 531 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Shelton
v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 346 U.S. 892 (1953). Where
the issue has been raised, it is clear that failure to disclose any impeaching matter is
sufficient to require reversal. United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946)
(evidence of bias).
A similar diversity of views exists in the states. Some courts require a showing of
contradiction. Rosier v. People, 126 Colo. 82, 247 P.2d 448 (1952) ; People v. Moses,
142 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1957). But see People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956).
Other.courts have rested discretion in the trial judge. State v. Pembianchi, 139 Conn.
543, 95 A.2d 695 (1953); Commonwealth v. Galvan, 323 Mass. 205, 80 N.E.2d 825
(1948); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 909.18 (1944). A few courts have refused any
disclosure. State v. Arnold, 84 Mont. 348, 275 Pac. 757 (1929) ; State v. Thomasson,
97 N.E2d 42 (Ohio App. 1950). The basis for this result seems to be a "reciprocity"
theory; since the defendant may avail himself of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion to conceal relevant matter, the prosecution should have a reciprocal privilege.
State v. Bunk, 63 A.2d 842, 844 (N.J. 1949). For a criticism of this theory, see Com-
ment, Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases, 60 YALi L.J. 626, 634-35 (1951).
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the defendant, had not been dearly articulated by the Supreme Court
until its recent decision in Jencks v. United States.11
In the Jencks case, petitioner, a labor union official, was convicted
of making false statements in a non-communist affidavit filed pursuant
to section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act.12 Two of the government wit-
nesses had been members of the communist party during the time it was
alleged petitioner had been a member, and had reported to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation concerning petitioner's activities. At the trial, his
counsel sought production of these reports for examination by the trial
judge and delivery to the defendant of such of them as he found relevant.
The trial judge denied the motion and the circuit court affirmed.13 On
appeal, the Government urged that in the absence of a showing of contra-
diction the reports were privileged against disclosure under the rules of
the Department of Justice.' 4 The Supreme Court reversed Ir holding that
petitioner, without showing contradiction, 16 was entitled to inspect the
witness' statements "touching the events and activities as to which [the
witnesses] testified at the trial." "7 Further, the practice of producing the
statements first to the trial judge was disapproved; the Court directed that
the trial judge's determination of the admissibility of any portion of the
report could be made only after inspection by the defendant.' s
By indicating that the function of the trial judge was limited to a deter-
mination of the admissibility of a witness' statement after production and
11. 353 U.S. 657 (1957). The Second Circuit, until the Jencky case, has been uni-
form in requiring disclosure of only those portions of a witness' statements which
would be admissible to impeach him. See cases cited in note 9 supra. Other circuits,
not following the Second Circuit rule, have not stated the extent of the disclosure re-
quired.
12. 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(h) (1952).
13. 226 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1955). The court of appeals held that the defendant
must make a prior showing of contradiction, relying on Shelton v. United States, 205
F.2d 806 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 346 U.S. 892 (1953). However, it would appear
that the court's reliance was misplaced since in -that case the trial judge had examined
the statement and the court held he need not turn it over to the defendant unless he
found a contradiction. Id. at 814.
14. See note 2 supra.
15. Justices Burton and Harlan concurred on another ground. Justice Clark dis-
sented and Justice Whittaker did not participate.
16. See note 7 supra.
17. 353 U.S. at 668. The Court indicated that sufficient limits on the defendant's
request for production were provided by the distinction between a "blind fishing expedi-
tion" and a demand for specific documents. Id. at 667. Although such a distinction
would be applied on a case to case basis by the trial judge, errors on his part could
not be enforced by the Government. Assuming the trial judge granted a demand, if
the Government elected not to produce its case would be dismissed. If it did produce
the statements and a verdict of acquittal was rendered, the Government could not ap-
peal. Finally, if it produced the statements and still won a conviction, the defendant on
appeal would hardly raise the issue.
18. "The practice of producing government documents to the trial judge for his
determination of relevancy and materiality, without hearing the accused, is disapproved.
Relevancy and materiality for the purposes of production and inspection, with a view
to use on cross-examination, are established when the reports are shown to relate to
the testimony of the witness. Only after inspection of the reports by the accused, must
the trial judge determine admissibility-e.g., evidentiary questions of inconsistency, ma-
teriality and relevancy-of the contents and the method to be employed for the elim-
ination of parts immaterial or irrelevant." Id. at 669.
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examination by the defendant, the Court left unclarified the problem of
whether portions of a witness' statement, even though unrelated to his
testimony, could be excised from the report prior to examination by the
defendant. 19 In prosecutions pending at the time of the decision lower
federal courts reached sharply conflicting results on the issue.20 This
diversity in application of the Jencks decision 2 l fomented the enactment
of congressional legislation. 22 The statute reasserts the holding of the
19. "We now hold that petitioner was entitled to an order directing the Govern-
ment to produce for inspection all reports ... touching the events and activities as to
which [the witnesses] testified at the trial." Id. at 668.
20. [Unless otherwise cited, the following cases are taken from a brief printed in
103 CoNG. Rrc. 14551-54 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1957) ].
Several cases held that the Government must produce an entire investigative re-
port. E.g., United States v. Stanley (N.D. Ga.) (the court held that the Government
could not delete nonrelevant portions) ; United States v. Erie Co. Malt Beverage Dist.
Ass'n (W.D. Pa.); United States v. Young (S.D. Tex.) (122 documents; defense
counsel called government attorney the day after the order and said "Mail them to
me"). Contra, United States v. Anderson (E.D. Mo.). See also United States v. Ros-
enburg, Crim. No. 12,209, 3d Cir., June 26, 1957, reversing, 146 F Supp. 555 (E.D. Pa.
1956). Compare Simms v. United States, 26 U.S.L. WMK 2028 (D.C. Cir. July 8,
1957) (held that the Jencks case does not require disclosure where the defense sought
the requested statements to show the criminal record of the witness), wit/h United
States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946) (the court, prior to Jencks, held it
reversible error for the trial judge not to read the statements to see if they contained
data showing previous disciplining of the witnesses).
It was held that the Jencks decision guarantees the defendant a right to inspect the
statements of potential government witnesses at pretrial. United States v. Hall, 26
U.S.L. WEEx 2060 (W.D. Ky. July 22, 1957) (the agent-in-charge of the local office of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, under orders from Attorney General Brownell,
refused to produce the statements. The court insisted that the trial continue and held
the agent in contempt of court under a fine of $1,000. Christian Science Monitor, Aug.
14, 1957, p. P(R), col. 4. Contra, United States v. Palermo, New York Times, Aug.
27, 1957, p. 24, col. 3; United States v. Grossman, 26 U.S.L. W=sx 2060 (D.N.J. July
12, 1957) ; United States v. Benson, 25 U.S.L. WEnK 2603 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 1957).
21. See note 20 supra.
22. Pub. L. No. 85-269, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3500 (Sept. 2, 1957). The relevant
parts of the statute provide: "(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United
States, no statement or report in the possession of the United States which was made
by a Government witness ... shall be the subject of . .. discovery ... until said
witness has testified on direct examination. . . . (b) After a witness called by the
United States has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the de-
fendant, order the United States to produce any statement... of the witness in the
possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the
witness has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate to the subject
matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly
to the defendant for his examination and use. (c) If the United States claims that any
statement ordered to be produced under this section contains matter which does not
relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order the
United States to deliver such statement for the inspection of the court in camera. Upon
such delivery the court shall excise the portions of such statement which do not relate
to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness. With such material excised, the
court shall then direct delivery of such statement to the defendant for his use. If, pur-
suant to such procedure, any portion of such statement is withheld from the defendant
and the defendant objects to such withholding, and the trial is continued to an adjudi-
cation of the guilt of the defendant, the entire text of such statement shall be pre-
served by the United States and, in the event the defendant appeals, shall be made
available to the appellate court for the purpose of determining the correctness of the
ruling of the trial judge. . . . (d) If the United States elects not to comply with an
order of the court under paragraph (b) or (c) hereof to deliver to the defendant any
such statement, or such portion thereof as the court may direct, the court shall strike
from the record the testimony of the witness, and the trial shall proceed unless the
court in its discretion shall determine that the interests of justice require that a mis-
trial be declared."
19571
114 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106
Jencks case that the defendant is entitled to prior statements of a govern-
ment witness which relate "to the subject matter as to which the witness
has testified." 2 If the Government claims, however, that a statement
contains matter which is not relevant, the statement is to be produced for
examination by the trial judge in camera who will excise irrelevant ma-
terial.24  The statute further provides a procedure for correcting errors
by the trial judge on appeal.25
By clarifying the position of the trial judge, the statute insures that
only relevant material will be turned over to the defendant, a matter left
uncertain by the Jencks decision.26  Furthermore, rejection by the statute
of the Second Circuit view,27 which limits disclosure to statements found
by the judge in an ex parte determination to be admissible for the purposes
of impeachment,2 8 appears sound. The trial judge does not have the same
insight into the facts as do the parties so as to be aware of all that might
impeach. By permitting the defendant to inspect all factually relevant
statements and by having the trial judge hear both parties on relevance for
admissibility, the danger of impeaching evidence passing unnoticed is
diminished. On the other hand, ordering disclosure of all factually relevant
information may result in disclosure of a greater amount of matter vital
to national security.- Apparently, both the Court in Jencks and Congress
in enacting the statute prefer the interest of the defendant in this matter.
The penalty on the Government for non-disclosure, however, is lessened by
the provision in the statute that in the event of failure of the Government
to comply with a disclosure order, the judge has discretion either to strike
the testimony of the witness or to declare a mistrial. 0  It would seem that
in view of the protection afforded the defendant, the balance struck by the
statute is reasonable.
It is in connection with privileges other than the statutory privilege
applying generally to governmental documents that the statute may have its
greatest impact, although perhaps unwittingly so. While the decision in
the Jencks case is limited by its facts (a prior statement of a witness,
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. If the trial results in conviction, the Government is to preserve the statement
and, if the defendant appeals, make it available to the appellate court for its inspection.
26. See text and notes at notes 19-20 supra.
27. Jencks similarly rejected this view. See text and note at note 18 supra.
28. See text and notes at notes 9-10 supra.
29. Besides the statutory privilege, tvo common-law privileges-the privilege pro-
tecting the names of informers and that protecting state secrets-have served to bar
disclosure of a certain amount of information in government files vital to national se-
curity. The state secret privilege, for example, would protect evidence involving mili-
tary affairs or concerning international relations, but neither would probably protect
such matters as investigative techniques of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or in-
formation it collects on subversive activities. See Hoover, The Confidential Nature of
FBI Reports, 8 SYR. L. Rr~v. 2 (1956). Therefore, constriction of the statutory privi-
lege will have the possible effect of revealing a greater amount of security information.
30. Pub. L. No. 85-269, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3500 (Sept. 2, 1957). In this con-
text, the judge cannot hold in contempt governmental officials refusing to comply with
an order for production. Cf. note 20 supra.
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privileged under departmental regulations, and not used by the witness on
the stand), the statute admits no such limitation. It seems clear that the
hitherto prevailing view on disclosure of privileged statements of a witness
used to refresh his recollection, which rested disclosure in the discretion
of the trial judge,8 1 has been nullified. More significant is the statute's
applicability to the privilege against disclosure of the names of informers,
3 2
with reference to which the Supreme Court has said that "no fixed rule
with respect to disclosure is justifiable" 33 and that the problem is one
"that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of in-
formation against the individual's right to prepare his defense." 34 Simi-
larly effected is the common-law privilege for state secrets which is in-
dependent of statutory regulations and exists for information "involving
the public security or concerning the military organization or plans of the
United States . . . or concerning international relations." 3 5 Under the
statute, if any of these privileges are involved in a report by a government
witness, the trial judge must, nevertheless, order disclosure of the material
so long as it is factually relevant,3 6 regardless of countervailing considera-
tions. If the Government elects not to produce the documents, the testi-
mony of the witness will be stricken or the judge in his discretion, may
declare a mistrial. 7 Because the present formula would seem to endanger a
considerable amount of information vital to national security and because
it is not clear that Congress intended to impinge upon the common-law
privileges, it is suggested that Congress reconsider the problem with a
view toward clarifying its intent.
31. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 231-37 (1940).
32. 8 WIGmORZ, EviDNcz § 2374 (3d ed. 1940).
33. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957).
34. Ibid.
35. UNiFOR R L s oF EvIDENccE rule 33. See also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDE:cE § 2378,
at 785 (3d ed. 1940).
36. See text and notes at note 22 and note 23 sipra.
37. See text and note at note 30 supra.
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